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THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION DISTANCE ON OWNERSHIP STRATEGIES OF SPANISH AND 
PORTUGUESE MNES 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The ownership strategy of foreign subsidiaries is an important decision for multinational enterprises (MNEs). Previous 
research has analyzed the effect of country dimensions on this strategy, both from the home and the host country. In this 
paper we delve into the effect of differences between home and host country on the MNEs’ ownership strategies. 
Empirically, we analyze the influence of corruption distance on the ownership strategies of Spanish and Portuguese 
MNEs, using data from 3,941 foreign subsidiaries. We found that the higher the absolute corruption distance between 
Spain (or Portugal) and the host country, the higher the ownership controlled by MNEs. However, when the host is 
more corrupt than the home country, MNEs have a lower ownership level in the local subsidiaries. 
 
Keywords: Corruption Distance; Ownership Strategy; Home-Host Differences; Portugal; Spain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O IMPACTO DA DISTÂNCIA DE CORRUPÇÃO NAS ESTRATÉGIAS DE POSSE DE PMES ESPANHOLAS 
E PORTUGUESAS 
 
 
 
RESUMO 
 
A estratégia de posse de subsidiárias no estrangeiro é uma importante decisão para empresas multinacionais (EMNs). 
Pesquisa anterior analisou o efeito de dimensões do país na estratégia de posse, quer do país de origem quer do país 
receptor. Neste artigo escrutinamos o efeito das diferenças entre o país de origem e o país receptor na estratégia de 
posse de EMNs. Empiricamente, analisamos a influência da distância de corrupção nas estratégias de posse de EMNs 
espanholas e portuguesas, usando dados de 3.941 subsidiárias no estrangeiro. Concluímos que quanto maior a distância 
de corrupção (em valor absoluto) entre Espanha (ou Portugal) e o país receptor, maior o nível de posse detido pela 
EMN. Contudo, quando o receptor é mais corrupto que o país de origem, as EMNs têm detêm um nível de posse mais 
baixo nas subsidiárias locais. 
 
Palavras-chave: Distância de Corrupção; Estratégia de Posse; Diferenças Origem-Destino; Portugal; Espanha. 
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EL IMPACTO DE LA DISTANCIA DE CORRUPCIÓN EN LAS ESTRATEGIAS DE PROPIEDAD DE LAS 
EMN DE ESPAÑOLAS Y PORTUGUESAS 
 
 
RESUMEN 
 
La estrategia de propiedad de subsidiarias en el extranjero es una importante decisión para empresas multinacionales 
(EMN). Investigación anterior analizó el efecto de dimensiones del país en la estrategia de posesión, tanto del país de 
origen como del país receptor. En este artículo escudriñamos el efecto de las diferencias entre el país de origen y el país 
receptor en la estrategia de propiedad de EMN. Empíricamente, se analiza la influencia de la distancia de la corrupción 
en las estrategias de propiedad de las multinacionales españolas y portuguesas, utilizando los datos de 3.941 filiales en 
el extranjero. Llegamos a la conclusión de que cuanto más grande es la distancia de la corrupción (en valor absoluto) 
entre España (o Portugal) y el país anfitrión, más grande es el nivel de participación de las EMN. Sin embargo, cuando 
el recetor es más corrupto que el país de origen, las EMN tienen un nivel de posesión más bajo en las subsidiarias 
locales. 
 
Palabras-clave: Distancia de Corrupción; Estrategia de Propiedad; Diferencias Origen-Destino; Portugal; España. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
When deciding to conduct foreign direct 
investments (FDI) in a foreign market, multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) need to decide on the ownership 
strategy (Stopford & Wells, 1972; Godinez & Liu, 
2015). Deciding on how to enter in a different market 
determines the success of international operations 
(Stopford & Wells, 1972; Chari & Chang, 2009; 
Duanmu, 2011; Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). 
The extent of ownership in the foreign subsidiaries 
determines such issues as resource commitment, risk, 
investment return and control (Anderson & Gatignon, 
1986; Luo, 2001). In fact, international ownership 
strategy is a central issue in economic theory and has 
become one of the main objects of study in 
International Business (IB) research (Duanmu, 2011; 
Wang & Larimo, 2018). For instance, the choice 
between wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) and joint 
venture (JV) has been subject of multiple investigations 
and many factors have been found to have an impact 
on the decision, such as the international experience of 
the firm, cultural distance between the investing 
country and the host country and other transaction cost 
related characteristics (Duanmu, 2011). Recently, 
scholars have recommended exploring the effect of the 
quality of the host country’s “governance 
infrastructure” (Slangen & Van Tulder, 2009,  p. 277) 
on the ownership strategies. One of the most crucial 
dimensions, due to its impact on economy, is 
corruption (Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). 
Corruption has been widely researched in IB 
literature (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Corruption, 
commonly defined as “the misuse of public office for 
private gain” (Svensson, 2005, p. 20) is posited to have 
a negative impact on society and on economic activity 
(Voyer & Beamish, 2004). Arguments that corruption 
inhibits private investment and economic growth 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995), reduces the 
legitimacy of governments (Anderson & Tverdova, 
2003) and affects political and social stability (Gupta & 
Abed, 2002), are often used to demonstrate that 
corruption has a negative impact on firms’ performance 
and thereby on the economic development of countries. 
Nevertheless, the effect of corruption on firms’ 
decisions in not completely understood (Cuervo-
Cazurra & Genc, 2011). Recently, scholars have been 
exploring how the differences in corruption among 
countries influence MNEs’ ownership strategies 
(Tekin-Koru, 2006; Duanmu, 2011). The difference in 
the corruption between the home and host countries 
refers to the concept of corruption distance (Eden & 
Miller, 2004). This is a relatively new concept so its 
impact on ownership strategies is still very little 
known. Although the number of empirical studies on 
corruption distance and its effects is small, the results 
show that the greater the corruption distance between 
the home country and the host country, the greater the 
likelihood that MNEs will prefer WOS over JV (Tekin-
Koru, 2006; Duanmu, 2011). However, other studies 
indicate that greater corruption distance increases the 
likelihood of firms selecting a shared ownership of the 
subsidiary (Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2012). Thus, the 
conflicting results in the literature offer a gap for 
further research that we try to address in this paper. 
Furthermore, the existing studies on corruption 
distance and ownership strategies analyze emerging 
countries, namely China (Duanmu, 2011) and Russia 
(Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2012) thereby warranting the 
need for analysis of MNEs from developed countries. 
In this paper we explore the effect of corruption 
distance on ownership strategies of Spanish and 
Portuguese MNEs. On one hand, we investigate 
whether increases in corruption distance between Spain 
or Portugal and a host country lead to higher ownership 
levels by Spanish and Portuguese MNEs in foreign 
subsidiaries. On the other hand, we explore the effect 
of the direction of corruption distance on ownership 
strategies, advancing different impacts depending on 
whether the host country is more or less corrupt than 
Spain or Portugal. Empirically, we analyze 3,941 
foreign subsidiaries of Spanish and Portuguese MNEs 
(3,139 Spanish subsidiaries and 802 Portuguese 
subsidiaries), located in 68 countries. Using generally 
accepted data on corruption (Ferreira et al., 2017), we 
found broad support for the proposed effects of 
corruption on ownership strategies. 
We contribute to the extant knowledge in three 
manners. First, we contribute to a better understanding 
of corruption distance and its effect. While a wealth of 
research on corruption exist, the effect of corruption 
distance (i.e. the differences between the corruption 
levels of the two countries) is still underexplored. We 
shed light on this issue by advancing a model that 
posits a greater corruption distance will influence firms 
to choose greater ownership. We argue that MNEs 
cope with the increased uncertainty caused by large 
differences by choosing to control more ownership. 
Second, we contribute to the literature by 
empirically testing a relatively novel concept, the 
direction of corruption distance, extending the grasp of 
country-level asymmetrical differences. We conclude 
that the direction of corruption distance matters and 
influences the ownership strategy followed by MNEs. 
Specifically, we conclude that negative corruption 
distance (i.e. a host country with higher corruption 
levels than the home country) leads MNEs to seek a 
lower ownership, thus requiring a local partner with the 
necessary knowledge to perform the corrupt activities.  
Finally, we contribute to a better understanding 
of the strategic choices of Spanish and Portuguese 
MNEs, in particular how corruption distance influences 
their decisions regarding the control exerted over 
foreign subsidiaries. This is an underexplored research 
setting that requires a greater understanding due to its 
idiosyncrasies. While Spain and Portugal have lower 
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corruption levels than emerging countries, they have 
higher corruption levels than other European Union 
countries. This suggests that Spanish and Portuguese 
MNEs may be influenced by corruption distance in a 
different way than the one posited in the literature. 
The paper is structured as follows. We present 
the literature review and introduce the hypotheses in 
following section. We then describe the dataset and the 
research methodology in the third section and present 
the results of our empirical study in the fourth section. 
We conclude with a broad discussion of the 
implications of our findings, the limitations of the 
paper and possible avenues for future research. 
 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Corruption and FDI 
 
Corruption inhibits private investment and 
economic growth (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 
1995), reduces the legitimacy of government 
(Anderson & Tverdova, 2003) and affects political and 
social stability (Gupta & Abed, 2002). The evidence 
shows that corruption represents a challenge not only 
for transition economies but also for developed 
countries (Bellos & Subasat, 2012). The World 
Economic Forum, for instance, estimates that the cost 
of corruption represents more than 5% of global GDP 
(approximately US$ 2.6 trillion) and increases the cost 
of doing business by up to 10% on average (OECD, 
2014). 
Corruption and its effects, especially on FDI, 
are a central issue in IB literature (Duanmu, 2011). 
However, there is no agreement concerning the effect 
of corruption on FDI (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). There 
are theoretical arguments suggesting a negative effect 
of corruption on FDI but there are also arguments 
suggesting a positive effect (Duanmu, 2011). Although 
there is evidence supporting both views of corruption, 
the empirical evidence suggests a prevailing negative 
impact on FDI (Wei, 2000a; Wei, 2000b; Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2003; Voyer & 
Beamish, 2004; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Duanmu, 
2011).  
The relationship between corruption and 
ownership strategies of MNEs has received less 
attention in the literature (Duanmu, 2011; Di Guardo, 
Marrocu & Paci, 2016). One of the earliest studies on 
this topic was conducted by Smarzynska and Wei 
(2000). In their cross-sectional analysis of FDI in 
Eastern Bloc countries, high levels of corruption in the 
host country are posited to lead to a preference of 
shared control, such as JVs over WOS (Smarzynska & 
Wei, 2000). The authors argue that a lower level of 
ownership helps to reduce commitment and risk 
associated with the investment and may also be a 
sensible reaction to the uncertainty experienced in 
these transition countries (Smarzynska & Wei, 2000). 
Based on institutional theory, Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, 
Doh and Eden (2006) suggest that MNEs respond to 
pervasive and arbitrary corruption in host countries by 
selecting specific modes of entry. Analyzing data on 
telecommunications development projects in emerging 
economies, the authors find that the more pervasive the 
level of corruption in the host country, the greater the 
possibility of MNEs choosing WOS over JV. Finally, 
Di Guardo, Marrocu and Paci (2016) found that the 
relationship between the level of corruption of the host 
country and the firm’s probability of choosing full 
control mode in cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
is U-shaped. Moreover, the authors argue that industry 
relatedness between acquirer and target and the level of 
connectivity between home and host countries 
moderate the relationship between the level of 
corruption of the host country and the level of control 
(Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). 
 
Corruption distance and ownership strategies 
 
Corruption distance is defined as the difference 
in pervasive and arbitrary corruption of the public 
sector between home and host countries (Eden & 
Miller, 2004). The corruption distance offers another 
perspective to analyze the effect of corruption on 
MNEs’ decisions. It allows to consider simultaneously 
the characteristics of home and host countries (Eden & 
Miller, 2004). Host country corruption has a direct 
impact on FDI but also an indirect effect: formal 
institutions in the host country may interact with 
institutions in the home country, which may 
themselves interact with informal institutions (Holmes 
et al., 2013), affecting the way foreign investors act 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Thus, the level of uncertainty 
and the costs associated with corruption may vary 
depending on the host country, on the home country of 
the investors and on the differences in the corruption 
levels between the home and the host countries 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). Using the corruption distance 
concept, Tekin-Koru (2006) and Duanmu (2011) 
provided two of the few studies on the impact of 
corruption distance on entry modes. Both studies 
suggest that the higher the corruption distance between 
the home country and the host country, the greater the 
preference of MNEs for WOS over JV (Tekin-Koru, 
2006; Duanmu, 2011). 
When the levels of corruption of the host 
country are too high, corruption is considered 
institutionalized (Gabbioneta et al., 2013). In this case, 
public and governmental authorities establish 
regulations which facilitate corruption and represent a 
source of income for them (Cheung, 1996). The 
institutional environment stimulates forms of direct 
corruption, by facilitating its occurrence and providing 
opportunities (Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Neu,  Rahaman 
& Martinez , 2013). MNEs from countries which have 
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a large corruption distance may need to warrant 
country-specific knowledge to operate in a dissimilar 
country – from a corruption perspective (Di Guardo, 
Marrocu & Paci, 2016). However, given the 
institutionalized corruption, the cost of maintaining a 
local partner and choosing a shared form of control 
outweighs the benefits making firms prefer WOS over 
JV (Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016).  
MNEs’ decide to have a higher level of 
ownership to reduce the costs and the risks (Di Guardo, 
Marrocu & Paci, 2016). From the investing MNE’s 
perspective, particularly if the firm is from a 
transparent country, WOS provides a higher level of 
control over the way the business is conducted (Di 
Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016) and ensures the respect 
of the values of the parent-firm (Gaur & Lu, 2007). 
The extra costs the investing firm may incur in 
addressing corrupt environments can be justified by 
considering the implications of protecting and 
sustaining its global image (Di Guardo, Marrocu & 
Paci, 2016). A higher control allows firms to reduce the 
costs associated with operating alone (Madhok, 1997) 
and makes possible for foreign investors to access and 
acquire organizationally embedded knowledge 
(Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998). Taking into account 
these arguments, we advance:  
 
Hypothesis 1. The greater the corruption 
distance between the home country 
(Portugal or Spain) and the host country, the 
greater the ownership MNEs will seek in 
local subsidiaries.  
 
Direction of corruption distance 
 
The level of corruption in the host country has 
different effects on foreign investors, depending on the 
level of corruption of the home country (Godinez & 
Liu, 2015). The effects of corruption on MNEs’ 
decisions vary according to the direction of corruption 
distance (Duanmu, 2011). When the levels of 
corruption in the host country are higher than the levels 
of corruption in the home country there is a negative 
corruption distance between them (Godinez & Liu, 
2015). Conversely, when the destination is less corrupt 
than the home country there is a positive corruption 
distance between them (Godinez & Liu, 2015). MNEs 
perceive and respond to corruption differently, 
according to their perceptions regarding the corruption 
level of their home country (Godinez & Liu, 2015). 
Several studies suggest that MNEs from more 
transparent countries avoid investing in highly corrupt 
countries (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). When the 
country of origin has low levels of corruption many 
firms may not have the knowledge and the skills 
necessary to deal with corruption (Pajunen, 2008). On 
the other hand, firms from highly corrupt environments 
may not be as sensitive to high corruption levels abroad 
(Godinez & Liu, 2015). A high level of corruption in 
the home country helps firms to develop the skills 
needed to deal with the phenomenon of corruption 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). In this case, corruption is not 
an obstacle to investment and may even by a source of 
competitive advantage for these firms, comparing to 
those from transparent countries (Suchman, 1995; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008). 
When investing in a more corrupt country 
MNEs may prefer to have a local partner (Godinez & 
Liu, 2015). Higher corruption represents higher 
uncertainty, higher risk and higher costs for MNEs (Di 
Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). To deal with these 
problems, MNEs may establish a partnership with a 
local firm with market knowledge, sharing the risks 
and the costs associated with the investment and the 
control over the business operations (Smarzynska & 
Wei, 2000; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). The establishment 
of a partnership with a local firm may be the only way 
foreign investors have to access to the market 
(Smarzynska & Wei, 2000; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006) 
and achieve the necessary external legitimacy 
(Beamish, 1985). Therefore, we hypothesize that when 
the direction of corruption distance is negative, the 
effect of corruption distance on ownership strategy of 
MNEs may diminishes. 
When the levels of corruption of the host 
country are low or significantly lower than those of the 
home country, the benefits of full ownership balance its 
costs (Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). In countries 
with relatively good governance, i.e. “with a 
transparent, impartial and effective legal system that 
protects property and individual rights; with stable, 
credible and honest public institutions; and with 
government policies that promote open and free 
markets.” (Hernández & Nieto, 2015, p. 124), there is a 
better chance of firms entering through FDI 
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2003). Foreign investors 
should be able to operate easier in environments in 
which the “rules of the game” are more clearly 
established (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2011). When the 
host countries show significant lower levels of 
corruption than the home country, firms tend to adapt 
easier to those markets since they are entering less 
uncertain environments (Hernández & Nieto, 2015). 
Thus, foreign investors will feel safer to invest alone 
without the need for a local partner (Di Guardo, 
Marrocu & Paci, 2016). The benefits of total ownership 
balance the costs of the investment (Di Guardo, 
Marrocu & Paci, 2016) and a higher level of control 
allows firms to reduce the costs of operating alone. 
Considering these arguments, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2a.Negative corruption distance 
between the home country (Portugal or 
Spain) and the host country moderates the 
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effect of corruption distance, thus making 
smaller the ownership MNEs will seek in 
local subsidiaries. 
Hypothesis 2b. Positive corruption distance 
between the home country (Portugal or 
Spain) and the host country heightens the 
effect of corruption distance, thus making 
greater the ownership MNEs will seek in 
local subsidiaries. 
 
Figure 1 below depicts the proposed effects. 
 
Figure 1 - Conceptual model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
3 METHOD 
 
Data and sample 
 
Data on ownership of Spanish and Portuguese 
MNEs on international subsidiaries were collected 
from Sabi – Sistema de Análise de Balanços Ibéricos, 
Bureau Van Dijk. This database contains 
comprehensive information on more than 2.5 million 
Spanish and Portuguese firms. To select our sample, 
we considered the foreign subsidiaries in which MNEs 
controlled at least 5% of ownership (under 5% equity 
the deals are considered for portfolio investment – cf. 
Chari and Chang (2009)). We also excluded 
subsidiaries from the financial sector and subsidiaries 
located in offshores, as well as Specific Purpose 
Entities (Ferreira et al., 2017). Finally, we include only 
the observations for which 2015 data are available. 
This selection process yields a sample of 3,941 
subsidiaries (3,139 Spanish subsidiaries and 802 
Portuguese subsidiaries), located in 68 countries. The 
main markets of destination for Portuguese MNEs are 
Spain (388 subsidiaries), France (95 subsidiaries) and 
Angola (49 subsidiaries). For the Spanish firms, 
Portugal (771 subsidiaries), Italy (317 subsidiaries) and 
France (310 subsidiaries) are the main destinations. 
Nevertheless, due to missing values in some variables, 
2,786 observations were used to compute our models. 
 
Variables 
 
Ownership. The dependent variable in our 
empirical models is the ownership level of Spanish and 
Portuguese MNEs in subsidiaries located abroad. 
Ownership can take any value over 0% and less than or 
equal to 100%. For this study, we excluded all 
observations where the ownership in local subsidiaries 
was lower than 5%. Thus, our dependent variable may 
take any value between 5 and 100%. Data on this 
variable were collected from Sabi database.  
Corruption distance. The main explanatory 
variable of interest is corruption distance. Corruption 
distance is the difference in the levels of corruption 
between the home and host countries (Eden & Miller, 
2004). The level of corruption is the degree of 
corruption of the public sector perceived by analysts, 
businesspeople and experts in a specific country. 
Corruption distance is a continuous variable and it 
corresponds to the absolute difference between the 
inverse of the value of the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) for the home country (Portugal or Spain) 
and the inverse of the value of the CPI for the host 
country. The CPI is an aggregate indicator that 
combines data on corruption from 13 independent 
global institutions. Although some researchers have 
emphasized the need to use more experience-based 
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measures of corruption, the CPI still offers a reliable 
measure of perceived corruption in different countries, 
which significantly affects investors’ decisions (Mauro, 
1995; Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). The CPI 
ranges from 0 to 100. A value of 0 means that the 
country is “highly corrupt” and 100 means the country 
is “very clean”. For the sake of clarity, we use the 
inverse of the original index so that low values indicate 
low levels of corruption and high values indicate high 
levels of corruption (Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 
2016). 
Distance direction. This is a binary variable that 
takes the value 1 when the corruption distance is 
negative (i.e., the host country is more corrupt than the 
home country) and the value 0 when the corruption 
distance is positive (i.e., the host country is less corrupt 
than the home country). This variable allows us to 
identify the observations via the relative position of the 
host country compared to the home country in terms of 
corruption distance. The study constructs another 
independent variable – Corruption distance  Distance 
direction – by means of the interaction of these 
variables.  
All estimated models include control variables 
that may influence the relationship between corruption 
distance and MNEs ownership strategies. These 
variables control for characteristics of the home 
country, characteristics of the host country and 
characteristics of the firms. The full sources and 
definitions of the variables are reported in Appendix I. 
Home country GDP. We used the natural 
logarithm of home country GDP to control for the size 
of the country. We collected the data from World 
Development Indicators, a World Bank report covering 
a wide number of issues. 
Geographic distance. Geographic distance 
increases transportation and telecommunication costs 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Ferreira et al., 2017) that 
would discourage trade and favor FDI (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008). Therefore it is a factor that is likely to 
influence MNEs’ investment decisions. We used the 
natural logarithm of the distance in km between Lisbon 
or Madrid and the capital of the host country. 
Host country GDP. We used the natural 
logarithm of host country GDP to control for the host 
country economic size (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Data 
were collected from World Development Indicators. 
Host country risk. We also controlled for the 
risk of the host country, since it may influence MNEs 
ownership strategy (Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 
2016). The indicator used is a composite index, 
computed by the Political Risk Service (PRS) group, 
which includes several dimensions, such as 
government stability, socioeconomic conditions, 
investment profile, internal and external conflicts, 
military in politics, religious tensions, law and order, 
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and 
bureaucracy quality. This index ranges from 0 to 100 
but once again we use the inverse of the original index 
so that a low score indicates lower risk and a high score 
indicates a high risk. 
Host country unemployment. We used the 
unemployment rate of the host country to indicate the 
attractiveness of the country since investors are aware 
that employees will be more loyal when they lack other 
opportunities of employment (Godinez & Liu, 2015). 
Data were collected from World Development 
Indicators. 
Investing firm size. Operating revenue 
(thousands of euros) was used as a proxy for MNE 
size. It has been argued that larger firms have greater 
resource availability to acquire a larger ownership in 
other firms (Chari & Chang, 2009). Data were 
collected from SABI. 
Subsidiary size. The natural logarithm of the 
number of employees of the subsidiary was used as an 
indicator of the size of the subsidiary. Data were 
collected from SABI. 
 
Procedure 
 
We used an OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) 
regression model in this study to analyze the effects of 
corruption distance on international ownership 
strategies of Spanish and Portuguese firms. The OLS 
approach is appropriate given the use of continuous 
variables in the study. Moreover, we conducted a 
regression diagnostic using the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) to identify any potential problems 
associated with multicollinearity. The test did not 
suggest any serious problem of multicollinearity 
between variables since none of the VIF values 
exceeded 8.475, which is lower than the threshold of 
10 used by most scholars (O’Brien, 2007). 
The dependent variable is measured at the end 
of 2015, while the explanatory variables are measured 
one year earlier to account for the time lag that occurs 
between the decision regarding the ownership strategy 
and the actual implementation of the strategy. 
The baseline model is specified as follows: 
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where  is the dependent variable which 
takes any value between 5 and 100%;   is the 
constant; , , , ,  and  are the coefficients 
of interest;  is the absolute 
corruption distance between the oth country of origin 
and the dth destination country; 
is a binary variable that takes 
the value 1 if corruption distance is negative and 0 if 
corruption distance is positive; 
presents the interaction between the absolute 
corruption distance between the oth country of origin 
and the dth destination country and distance direction; 
 is the cultural distance 
between  the oth country of origin and the dth 
destination country; 
 represents the moderation of the relationship between 
the absolute corruption distance between the oth 
country of origin and the dth destination country and 
the cultural distance between the oth country of origin 
and the dth destination country;  represents the 
control variables and  is the error term. 
It should be noted that in those observations in 
which the host country displays a higher level of 
corruption than the home country, i.e., there is a 
negative corruption distance between both countries 
(Distance direction equals 1), the model is determined 
by:  
 
 
 
And in the opposite case, for those observations 
in which the host country displays a lower level of 
corruption than the home country, i.e., there is a 
positive corruption distance between both countries, 
(Distance direction equals 0), the model is determined 
by the following equation:  
 
 
 
 
In terms of interpreting the results, then, the 
coefficient of Corruption distance ( ) is used to test 
H1 and H2b and the coefficients of Corruption distance 
and Corruption distance  Distance direction are used 
to test H2a (requiring us to add and  together). 
The coefficient of Distance direction ( ) represents 
the difference in the constant term of the observations 
of Distance direction with values equal to 0 and 1. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2b are supported if  is positive and 
statistically significant. Hypothesis 2a is supported if 
 is negative and statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and 
the correlation matrix for the variables included in the 
empirical analysis. Some of the variables show some 
degree of correlation which was expected, since many 
of the characteristics of a country tend to correlate 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). This level of correlation is 
also found in other studies (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Nevertheless, further testing 
revealed no evidence of multicollinearity: the VIFs 
range from 1.083 (investing firm size) to 7.667 
(corruption distance) and 8.475 (distance direction). 
Therefore, despite some correlation between the 
corruption distance and the direction of the corruption 
distance, all VIF scores are below the usual cut-off of 
10 thus indicating no multicollinearity problems 
(O’Brien, 2007).  
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Table 1 - Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Ownership 80.83 28.17 5.00 100.00 1          
2. Corruption 
distance  
12.44 8.94 1.00 44.00 
-0.03† 1         
3. Distance 
direction 
0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 
-0.08*** 0.36*** 1        
4. Home country 
GDP (Ln) 
27.59 0.72 26.16 27.95 
0.11*** 0.11*** -0.30*** 1       
5. Geographic 
distance 
7.19 1.10 5.85 9.90 
-0.03* 0.73*** 0.34*** 0.17*** 1      
6. Host country 
GDP (Ln) 
27.21 1.30 21.36 30.49 
0.00 0.06*** -0.08*** -0.15*** 0.08*** 1     
7. Host country 
risk 
23.74 5.60 7.00 47.00 
-0.08*** 0.02 0.36*** -0.08*** -0.18*** -0.10*** 1    
8. Host country 
unemployment 
rate 
11.38 5.76 0.80 28.00 
-0.02 -0.53*** 0.19*** -0.43*** -0.66*** -0.10*** 0.32*** 1   
9. Investing firm 
size 
632,880.78 1,664,700.63 -312,868.04 19,077,481.00 
0.06*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.04* 0.09*** -0.03† 0.01 -0.01 1  
10. Subsidiary 
size 
3.44 1.80 0.00 11.59 
-0.01 0.18*** -0.00 0.12*** 0.23*** 0.03 -0.04* -0.21*** 0.21*** 1 
 
Significance levels: †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
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Table 2 presents the results of analyzing the 
influence of corruption distance on Spanish and 
Portuguese MNEs ownership strategies. Model 1 
shows de analysis with only the control variables. 
Model 2 shows the analysis introducing the main 
explanatory variable, Corruption distance. The 
coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level. This supports Hypothesis 
1, i.e., the greater the corruption distance between the 
home country, Portugal or Spain, and the host country 
the greater the ownership MNEs will seek in local 
subsidiaries. In model 3 we also include Distance 
direction and the interaction between Corruption 
distance and Distance direction (i.e., Regulative 
distance  Distance direction). As can be observed in 
model 3, the coefficient for Corruption distance is 
again positive and significant at the level 0.001. This 
finding provides support for Hypothesis 2b by showing 
that when the distance is positive, corruption distance 
has a positive and significant impact on international 
ownership strategies, which means that MNEs seek a 
greater ownership in local subsidiaries (  
In contrast, the coefficient for Corruption 
distance  Distance direction is negative and 
statistically significant at the level 0.001 
( . As previously mentioned, the effect of 
corruption distance for those observations in which the 
host country displays greater levels of corruption than 
the home country is equivalent to adding the 
coefficient of Corruption distance to the coefficient of 
Corruption distance  Distance direction. Thus, when 
the host country is more corrupt than the home country, 
the resulting coefficient is negative 
( . This finding supports 
Hypothesis 2a by indicating that when the distance is 
negative, corruption distance has a negative impact on 
international ownership strategies, which means that 
MNEs seek a smaller ownership in local subsidiaries. 
We have also sought to discern the magnitude of the 
moderation effects (see Figure 2). We conclude that the 
moderating effect of the direction of corruption 
distance is more intense when the corruption distance 
is larger. In other words, when entering more corrupt 
countries (i.e. negative corruption distance direction), 
firms will require less ownership as the corruption 
distance increases. 
 
Figure 2 - Moderation effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors 
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Table 2 - Results of the analysis of the impact of corruption distance on MNEs ownership strategies 
 
 
 Dependent variable: Ownership 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Home country GDP 0.12***  0.13*** 0.14*** 
Host country GDP 0.02 0.01 -0.03 
Host country risk -0.06** -0.07*** 0.02 
Host country 
unemployment rate  
0.03 0.05 -0.03 
Geographic distance -0.02 -0.11** -0.14** 
Investing firm size 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
Subsidiary size -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
Corruption distance  0.12***  0.26*** 
Distance Direction   0.19*** 
Corruption distance  
Distance direction 
  -0.28*** 
R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.03 0.03 
F 9.50*** 9.82*** 9.28*** 
N 2,786 2,786 2,786 
 
Significance levels: †p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
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Post-hoc tests 
 
In addition to the tests presented above, we 
tested the 3 hypotheses for Spanish and Portuguese 
subsidiaries separately. For the Spanish subsidiaries, 
the results match the results presented above, 
supporting Hypotheses 1, 2a and 2b. For the 
Portuguese subsidiaries, none of the Hypotheses is 
supported. Since the home country characteristics 
(concerning corruption) are similar, we further 
investigated the sub-samples for firm-level 
characteristics (Table 3). We concluded the three firm-
level variables (Ownership, Investing firm size, and 
Subsidiary size) are significantly different in the 
Spanish and Portuguese sub-samples (for p<0.05). This 
suggests other factors may influence the ownership 
strategy of Portuguese firms. We further elaborate on 
the discussion section. 
 
Table 3 - Results of t-test for independent samples 
 
 Spain Portugal t-test 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Sig. 
Ownership 82.23 27.48190 74.53 29.86 0.000 
Investing 
firm size 
663,147.56 1,776,891.04 514,417.67 1,115,529.97 0.003 
Subsidiary 
size 
3.56 1.79 3.01 1.76 0.000 
 
 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we analyzed the influence of 
corruption distance on ownership strategies of Spanish 
and Portuguese MNEs. Existing literature on this 
subject is very limited, especially concerning the 
influence of the direction of corruption distance. The 
few empirical studies on this matter suggest that a 
higher corruption distance between home and host 
countries leads to a preference for WOS relative to JV. 
Our empirical analysis reveals that when corruption 
distance increases, MNEs seek a higher share of equity 
in local subsidiaries. Thus our results corroborate the 
conclusions of Tekin-Koru (2006) and Duanmu (2011). 
Moreover, the tests show that the direction of 
corruption distance matters: when the corruption 
distance is negative, MNEs seek a lower share of 
equity in local subsidiaries; in the opposite case, when 
the corruption distance between two countries is 
positive, MNEs tend to seek a higher share of equity in 
local subsidiaries. We therefore contribute to the 
literature on the effects of home-host countries 
differences, specifically advancing the understanding 
of the effect of corruption distance on ownership 
strategies. Furthermore, we shed light on the issue of 
asymmetrical home-host differences, by analyzing the 
direction of corruption distance.  
When the host country is less corrupt than the 
home country, the environment is perceived as less 
risky and less uncertain, so firms feel safer to invest 
alone (Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). A higher 
level of control over operations allows them to reduce 
the costs of operating alone (Madhok, 1997). 
Conversely, when the destination is significantly more 
corrupt that the home country, firms face higher risk 
and uncertainty. Corruption is considered 
institutionalized (Gabbioneta et al., 2013) and the 
institutional context encourages forms of direct 
corruption (Gabbioneta et al., 2013; Neu et al., 2013). 
From the investors perspective, especially for those 
from transparent countries, total ownership provides a 
greater control over the way the business is organized 
and conducted (Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016), in 
accordance with their values and principles (Gaur & 
Lu, 2007). The intermediation by a local partner, who 
might be willing to engage in corruption activities, may 
be a source of conflict, representing for the firm 
additional costs of monitoring without specific 
advantages (Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). 
Although a greater corruption distance, in 
absolute terms, leads to greater shares of equity in local 
subsidiaries, when the corruption distance is negative, 
the share of equity sought by MNEs decreases, as 
suggested in Hypothesis 2a. This means that when the 
host country is more corrupt than the home country, 
increases in corruption distance between both countries 
lead to a lower share of equity sought by MNEs. 
Higher levels of corruption, compared to those of the 
home country, represent a higher degree of uncertainty 
for foreign investors, therefore higher risk and costs 
(Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). A local partner, 
with market-knowledge, may speed up the adaptation 
of the firm to the local market and reduce the 
uncertainty and risk faced by the firm by sharing the 
costs of the investment and the control over the venture 
(Smarzynska & Wei, 2002; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). 
Moreover, investors can see a partnership as a means 
of obtaining the necessary skills and networks to 
navigate a corrupt environment (Canabal & White, 
2008; Brada, Drabek & Perez, 2012). 
When the host country shows lower levels of 
corruption than the home country, increases in 
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corruption distance between both countries lead to 
greater shares of equity in local subsidiaries, as 
suggested in Hypothesis 2b. Less corrupt environments 
are more institutionally developed and more favorable 
for foreign firms (Hernández & Nieto, 2015). This 
happens because these environments are less uncertain, 
allowing firms to adapt more easily (Hernández & 
Nieto, 2015). Foreign investors feel more confident 
about operating alone, without needing a local partner 
(Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). The high costs of 
operating alone in an unknown market are 
compensated by the benefits of total ownership, such as 
a higher control over the way business is conducted 
and a higher investment return (Di Guardo, Marrocu & 
Paci, 2016). 
The post-hoc tests do not support our findings 
for the sub-sample of Portuguese MNEs. This is a 
somewhat puzzling conclusion since the corruption 
levels of Portugal and Spain are rather similar. Thus, 
the lack of effect is arguably due to firm-specific 
characteristics, which are significantly different. 
Portuguese firms seem to prefer significantly less 
ownership in foreign subsidiaries than Spanish firms 
(74.53 versus 82.23). This strategic decision may be 
influenced by other firm level characteristics such as 
industry relatedness which has been found to reduce 
the ownership level selected (Contractor et al., 2014). 
Also, the prior connectivity between Portugal and the 
host countries may reduce the knowledge difference 
and thus decrease the uncertainty (Di Guardo, Marrocu 
& Paci, 2016). The geographical proximity to Spain 
and France, as well as historical colonial ties with 
Angola, the three main destinations, may contribute to 
explain why Portuguese MNEs require less ownership 
(Di Guardo, Marrocu & Paci, 2016). 
This study advances our knowledge of the 
impact of corruption distance and its direction, a 
subject that has so far received little discussion. Our 
findings show that distance direction matters and 
influences the decisions of MNEs regarding their 
international ownership strategies. This paper also 
provides a better understanding of how Spanish and 
Portuguese firms operate in international markets. 
Finally, this study is also important for managers. The 
results show that managers should evaluate foreign 
locations not only based on their corruption levels, but 
also on the difference and direction in corruption levels 
between their home country and the possible host 
country.  
 
Limitations and future research 
 
The empirical findings are subject to some 
limitations that emerge from the nature of the data 
presented. First, Spanish subsidiaries represent 80% of 
our sample and Portuguese ones only 20%. A more 
evenly distributed sample could produce more accurate 
results. Second, we did not account for the industry to 
which the parent-firm and subsidiary belong. Some 
industries in various countries limit foreign equity 
participations. In that case, the ownership strategy is 
determined by legal restrictions and not by any of the 
variables used in this study. Finally, this is a cross-
sectional study that makes it impossible to explore the 
effects of ownership determinants over time. Future 
research can explore the impact of corruption distance 
on ownership strategies over time, in a longitudinal 
study.  
In the future, it would be interesting to study the 
effect of corruption distance on the ownership strategy 
of firms with subsidiaries located in Portugal and 
Spain. Since corruption distance seems not to have any 
significant impact on ownership strategies of 
Portuguese MNEs, it would be also interesting for 
future work to analyze other institutional factors that 
may influence these decisions. The recognized impact 
of the institutional environment makes it necessary to 
explore the effect of institutional dimensions, such as 
the role of the government or the impact of legal issues, 
on the international ownership strategies of Portuguese 
firms. This effect is still little known. 
The effect of corruption on MNEs’ decisions 
has been receiving scholarly attention for a long time. 
Nevertheless, the full extent of corruption on MNEs’ is 
still underexplored. We contribute to shed light on this 
issue, specifically analyzing the differences in 
corruption levels between home and host countries. We 
conclude that greater differences lead firms to seek a 
greater degree of control. Furthermore, we investigate 
the effect of asymmetric differences in corruption 
levels. Our findings reveal that when operating in a 
country which is more corrupt than the home country 
(i.e. negative corruption distance), the MNEs will seek 
a lower equity position. In face of increased uncertainty 
caused by a more corrupt environment, MNEs rely 
more on local partners with more knowledge of the 
institutional setting. 
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Appendix I - Variables definitions and sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent 
variable 
Ownership 
strategy 
Share of equity sought by MNEs in local 
subsidiaries. May take any value between 
5 and 100% 
Sabi – Sistema de 
Análise de Balanços 
Ibéricos, Bureau Van 
Dijk 
Explanatory 
variables 
Corruption 
distance 
Absolute difference between the inverse 
of the value of the CPI for Portugal or 
Spain and the inverse of the value of the 
CPI for the host country (0 = highly 
corrupt to 100 = very clean), 2014 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2014– 
Transparency 
International 
 
Distance 
direction  
Dummy = 1 when the corruption distance 
is negative and 0 when it’s positive 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 2014– 
Transparency 
International  
Control 
variables 
Home country 
GDP 
Natural log of home country gross 
domestic product in millions of US$, 
2014 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
 
Geographic 
distance 
Natural log of the distance in km between 
Lisbon or Madrid and the capital city of 
the host country 
 
 
Host country 
GDP 
Natural log of host country gross 
domestic product in millions of US$, 
2014 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
 
Host country 
risk 
Inverse of the Risk Index (1 = high risk to 
100 = low risk), 2014 
PRS 
 
Host country 
unemployment 
rate 
Percentage of working-age population 
without employment, 2014 
World Development 
Indicators, World Bank 
 
Investing firm 
size 
Investing firm operating revenue in 
thousands of euros 
Sabi – Sistema de 
Análise de Balanços 
Ibéricos, Bureau Van 
Dijk 
 
Subsidiary size natural logarithm of the number of 
employees of the subsidiary  
Sabi – Sistema de 
Análise de Balanços 
Ibéricos, Bureau Van 
Dijk 
 
 
 
 
